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NOTES
Contracts-Meeting of the Minds and U.C.C. § 2-204
In a recent Illinois decision, Euclid Engineering Corporationv.
Illinois Power Company,1 the court had to determine the extent to
which the liberal approach of the Uniform Commercial Code toward contract law would be applied in the formation of a contract.
Defendant wrote plaintiff a letter inviting offers on certain generator
units "subject to our acceptance of purchaser's assurance that the
units will be used outside of the Illinois area." Following a telephone conversation between the parties, plaintiff offered by letter
to pay 30,000 dollars for the units "subject our inspection and approval." Defendant accepted the offer by letter and, had no further
correspondence ensued, plaintiff would have proved the existence of
a contract. But plaintiff then mailed a check for the amount with a
letter stating, "It is regrettable that our negotiations for the purchase of the equipment should result in controversy regarding our
ultimate disposition for re-sale," and clarifying its intention to be
free in disposing of the units throughout the United States except
for the Illinois area.
On the basis of section 2-204' of the Code plaintiff argued that
the correspondence between the parties constituted a valid contract.
The existence of a contract under that section became the decisive
issue on appeal. It appears that this court faced the dilemma of having not only to do justice between the parties but also to promote uni1

2

79 1I1App. 2d 145, 223 N.E.2d 409 (1967).
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-102(1): "This Act shall be liberally

construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies."
[Hereinafter cited as Code; textual section references are to the Code unless

otherwise indicated.]
'Code § 2-204: Formation in General
(1) A contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner sufficient
to show agreement, including conduct by both parties which recognizes

the existence of such a contract.
(2) An agreement sufficient to constitute a contract for sale may be
found even though the moment of its making is undetermined.
(3) Even though one or more terms are left open a contract for sale
does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate
remedy.
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formity under the Code.' The court disposed of the case by engrafting upon section 2-204 the theory of a meeting of the minds'
to find that there was no contract when all of the correspondence was
construed together.
The necessity of finding a meeting of the minds or mutual assent
as an indispensable element of a contract' is justified by the unfairness of holding one to an agreement to which he did not assent. 7
Therefore the attention of the court traditionally focused upon the
nature of "assent" and induced analyses in terms of subjective and
objective theories of contractual liability. The hypothetical basis
of the subjective theory is that the measure of agreement depends
upon actual mental assent, that is, whether both of the parties mentally determined and intended to enter into the same contract.' The
obvious disadvantage of such an approach is that "the devil himself
knoweth not the thought of man."' However, the parties should be
able to rely on representation rather than speculation in transacting
business. It is equally necessary for the court to be able to rely upon
something less elusive than thoughts to render justice in a particular
situation. Since the subjective mental state is determinable only by
permitting one to say what it was, perjury and a large element of self
interest are encouraged, further discrediting the subjective theory. 10
To minimize the foregoing difficulties 1 courts generally have adopted
the objective theory that manifested intent is supreme,' 2 not to be
'See Code Introductory Comment; Holahan, Contract Formalities and
the Uniform Commercial Code, 3 VILL. L. REv. 1, 9 (1952).
'"The

Uniform Commercial Code has not made any change in the basic

law." 79 Ill. App. 2d at 152, 223 N.E.2d at 413.
'G. GRIsMoRE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 11, § 49 (rev.
ed. J. Murray 1965); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 20 (1932); L. SIMPSON,

LAW OF CONTRACTS § 9 (2d ed. 1965).
"See O'Neill v. Corporate Trustees, Inc., 376 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1967);
Topeka Say. Ass'n v. Beck, 199 Kan. 272, 428 P.2d 779 (1967); Peters v.
Halligan, 182 Neb. 51, 152 N.W.2d 103 (1967); Richardson v. Greensboro
Whse. & Storage Co., 223 N.C. 344, 26 S.E.2d 897 (1943); Dodds v. St.
Louis Union Trust Co., 205 N.C. 153, 170 S.E. 652 (1933).
'See G. GRIsmoRE, supra note 6, § 12.
Y.B. Pasch. 17 Edw. 4, 2 (1462).
10 Phelps, The Nature of Mutual Assent in Contracts, 10 OKLA. L. REv.
410, 411 (1957).
1Id.

1

-RESTATEMENT OF CO NTRACTS § 20 (1932): A manifestation of mutual
assent by the parties to an informal contract is essential to its formation
and the acts by which such assent is manifested must be done with the
intent to do these acts; but ... neither mental assent to the promises in
the contract nor real or apparent intent that the promises shall be legally
binding is essential.
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"frustrated or altered by the secrets and undisclosed intent of one
of the parties to the contrary."' 8 The subjective theory, however, is
likely to remain an undercurrent in decisions' 4 because not all problems will be solvable through the objective approach. 5
In typical business transactions the buyer and seller enter into
many sales based on their knowledge of good business practice, custom, usage and perhaps commercial law, but generally they do not
contemplate the legal consequences of each action. Problems of contract formation arise, nevertheless, where human discord or, more
frequently, changing market conditions effect a change in one's intention to have a contract. 6 Rather than adhering to the traditional
analyses of contract formation in such a situation, the Code approach
in section 2-204
dispense[s] not only with formalities in contracting, but also with
the necessity of finding an exact time when the contract for sale
was made ...and with exactness or definiteness of "one or more
terms" of the contract .... In these respects its purpose is ap-

parently to empower or require courts to give legal consequences
to the rough-hewn deals of business men, even though they lack
the precision which the judicial mind would find indispensable .... 17

Section 2-204(1) provides for a contract involving the sale of
goods to be made in any manner showing agreement, including conduct by the parties recognizing that a contract exists. Its purpose
was to permit the court to treat "informal dealings as creating bind"Rodgers, McCabe, & Co. v. Bell, 156 N.C. 378, 382, 72 S.E. 817, 818
(1911); see White v. Corlies, 46 N.Y. 467 (Ct. App. 1871) ("unevinced
mental determination" without legal effect).
' It has been said of the subjective theory that "it must necessarily be
reckoned with even today, whatever the avowed theory may be. Moreover
it is only by keeping constantly in mind the possibility of a conflict of theory
. . . that one can hope to understand and to harmonize decisions .
G. GRIsmfoRuE, supra note 6, § 12.
" In Bruce Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 325
F.2d 2, 18 (3d Cir. 1963) appellee's representative testified that he thought
his automobile financing was being handled by a company other than appellant,
although the objective manifestations of appellee indicated that the contract
under examination was with appellant. Held, "[R]egardless of appellant's
objective manifestations . . . [appellee] never intended to accept appellant's
offer, if any, and that his conduct never reflected the recognition of a financing contract's existence ......

"046 CORNELL L.Q. 308, 310 (1961).

1955: STUDY OF
Leg. Doc. No. 65 (I) at 268 (1955)

' REPORT OF THE NEw YORK LAW REv. COMM'N FOR
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, N.Y.
[hereinafter cited as 1955 REPORT].
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No basic change was made in prior law' 9 except

to the extent that recognition of a contract by the parties creates a
test, unknown at common law,20 by which a contract may be found
when there is a bargain in fact. 2 Subsection (1) is probably of
little practical importance in view of the reliance by courts upon
similar language in section 2-207(3) .22
Section 2-204(2) initiates the principle that the precise moment
when a contract is made may be unknown without vitiating liability.
Its aim was to facilitate the formation of contracts by correspondence,s but the Code does not say that the court cannot find a calen18
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-204, N.C. Comment (1965).
"oCode § 2-204, Comment; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-204, N.C. Comment
(1965); 1955 REPORT 269; see RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 21 (1932):
"The manifestation of mutual assent may be made wholly or partly by written
or spoken words or by other acts or conduct."
20 1955 REPORT 271-273.
1 In Associated Hardware Supply Co. v. Big Wheel Distributing Co.,
355 F.2d 114 (3d Cir. 1965), the court relied upon the "liberal policy regarding formation of contracts of sale" of section 2-204(1) to find a contract in
a course of dealing between the parties.
" See 1955 REPORT 271-273. Compare Code § 1-201(11):
"Contract" means the total legal obligation which results from the
parties' agreement as affected by this Act and any other applicable rules of
law. (Compare "Agreement.")
with Code § 1-201(3):
"Agreement" means the bargain of the parties in fact as found in
their language or by implication from other circumstances including
course of dealing or usage of trade or course of performance as provided
in this Act (Sections 1-205 and 2-208). Whether an agreement has legal
consequences is determined by the provisions of this Act, if applicable;
otherwise by the law of contracts (Section 1-103). (Compare "Contract.")
One reason that it has not been necessary for the court to use § 2-204(1)
in a situation represented by Poel v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 216
N.Y. 310, 110 N.E. 619 (Ct. App. 1915) should be noted. There, following
plaintiffs offer, defendant made a "counter-offer" by making acceptance of
plaintiff's offer contingent on a prompt acknowledgment by plaintiff. Held,
no contract because plaintiff never acknowledged receipt of the offer. Today
the court seems to rely upon Code § 2-207 to find a contract in a Poel situation. In re Doughboy Industries, 17 App. Div. 2d 216, 233 N.Y.S.2d 488
(1962); cf. Valashinas v. Koniuto, 308 N.Y. 233, 124 N.E.2d 300 (Ct. App.
1954) (liberal decision, much criticized, antedating Code in New York). Buet
see Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. Bartlett & Co., 297 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1962).
Arguably Code § 2-204(1) is an equally valid ground for finding the
existence of a contract in a factual setting of the Poel type. However, section
2-207 has permitted courts to disregard material differences between offer
and acceptance and to overlook or incorporate additional terms in acceptance
in construing the terms of a contract. See generally 57 Nw. U.L. REV. 477
(1962). But section 2-207 is of limited utility in determining wzhen a contract
exists.
3 Code § 2-204, Comment.
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dar date for the commencement of a contract where necessary because of a statute of limitations.24
Section 2-204(3) states that even if certain terms are left "open"
a contract will not fail for indefiniteness if the parties intend to
make a contract and a reasonably certain basis exists for a remedy.
Contracts with open terms are intentionally approved,2 5 reflecting
their practical utility, but two pre-requisites must be met. The
first-that the parties intended to make a contract-restricts the
operation of the principle if it must be shown that the parties intended to assume a binding legal obligation in the course of informal
agreements.20 Proof requirements are less stringent, however, if an
intent to enter into a "bargain in fact" is sufficient. In determining
whether parties have intended to make a contract the courts, as in
Euclid, are likely to adhere to the salient policy of examining the
whole correspondence between the parties to ascertain whether the
latest expressed intent was to have a contract.2" The second prerequisite to an open terms contract is the existence of a "reasonably
certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy."2 9 Neither certainty
concerning the performance contemplated nor exactitude concerning
the amount of damages is required.3 Subsection (3) seems to
change prior law to some extent 8 ' for reports are laden with cases
stating that minds must meet as to all terms of a contract."2 The ex" See 1955 REPORT 269-271.
"Code § 2-204, Comment.
"1955 REPORT 279.
" This conflict between technical language ("contract") and a liberal
policy may have been created deliberately to enable courts to "do justice"
in each case. The difference in results will probably depend upon the extent
to which the courts choose to overlook differences in terms of acceptance,
Code § 2-207, or to disregard omissions. See Pennsylvania Co. v. Wilmington
Trust Co., 39 Del. Ch. 453, 463, 166 A.2d 726, 732 (1960) where it was
said that "those drafting the statute intended that the omission of even
an important term does not prevent the finding under the statute that the
parties intended to make a contract."
"'Elks v. North State Life Ins. Co., 159 N.C. 619, 75 S.E. 808 (1912);
Bristol, Cardiff, & Swansea AErated Bread Co. v. Maggs, 44 Ch. Div. 616

(1890).

" Code § 2-204(3). It appears from the two reported cases concerning
this subject that subsection (3) applies to a transfer of shares of stock, Wilmington Trust Co. v. Coulter, 41 Del. Ch. 458, 200 A.2d 441 (1964), and
includes situations wherein a contract may not be "sufficiently definite to be
specifically enforced yet which, upon breach, justifies the granting of damages," Pennsylvania Co. v. Wilmington Trust Co., 39 Del. Ch.453, 465, 166
A.2d 726, 733 (1960).
"Code § 2-204, Comment.

"See N.C.

GEN. STAT.

§ 25-2-204, N.C. Comment (1965), and cases

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

tent to which prior law is changed depends upon the number of exceptions which the particular jurisdiction has made to this stricter
rule.3" How indefinite a contract is permitted to be depends upon
commercial standards, but the greater the number of "open" terms
the less likely a contract will be found, 84 unless conduct is decisive
under section 2-204(1) or section 2-207(3).
The general tenor of the Code is, in summary, that ordinary and
technical contract rules should not govern sales contracts unless
they can further principles "unique to the commercial world.""8
But the court in Euclid relied upon the older common law principles
in approaching contract formation instead of finding clear and fixed
authority within the Code itself.3 " The court seems to have violated
Code policy by not finding contractual liability where conduct clearly
indicated contractual intent in terms of Code law. The Code formulation of mutual assent has received scant attention. This may be because section 2-204 has not been thought needed when section
2-207

7

and basic contract principles 38 are available; it may also be

because counsel have not recognized that section 2-204 makes subtle
variations in common law concepts of mutual assent which may be
used to advantage. Yet these concepts and their variations should be
recognized and implemented within the Code structure to produce a
more complete and reliable body of Code law, thereby facilitating
business transactions. 9 Within the breadth of section 2-204 social
justice in terms of business relationships is readily accessible withcited therein; 1955 REPORT 279. Cf. Weilersbacher v. Pittsburgh Brewing
Co., 421 Pa. 118, 121, 218 A.2d 806, 808 (1966) where an oral agreement
was held valid with reliance upon section 2-204(3).
2
See, e.g., O'Neill v. Corporate Trustees, Inc., 376 F.2d 818 (5th Cir.
1967).
" North Carolina, for example, has enforced "output" and "requirements"
contracts and has supplied terms in contracts otherwise proper for a "place
of delivery" and a "time for performance." See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-204,
N.C. Comment (1965), and cases cited therein.
'Code § 2-204, Comment.
85 Charney, How to Make a Contract Under the U. C. C., 16 BROOKLYN
BAR.80 18, 27 (1964).
See 13 U. Pirr. L. REv. 750 (1952).
Note 21 supra.

, Code § 1-103.
"'See Code § 1-102(2): "Underlying purposes and policies of this Act

are (a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial
transactions; (b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices
through custom, usage and agreement of the parties; (c) to make uniform
the law among the various jurisdictions."
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out unreservedly engrafting upon the Code such concepts as will
make of it a mutation and destroy its purpose."
THOMAS W. TAYLOR

Evidence-Privileged Communications Between

Husband and Wife
The North Carolina Supreme Court recently reconsidered its
position regarding privileged confidential communications between
husband and wife.1 In Hicks v. Hicks,' the wife had instituted a
suit under the provisions of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16 (Supp. 1967),'
for the custody of their eight-year-old daughter, for maintenance
and support for her and the child, and for counsel fees. The trial
record reveals that the husband had installed a tape recorder in the
basement of the home. There was no evidence that the wife knew
of the tape recorder. On three different occasions, in the presence of
their eight-year-old child, conversations between the husband and
wife were recorded. The opinion does not disclose what was said on
"See Corbin, Offer and Acceptance, and Some of the Resulting Legal
Relations, 26 YALE L.J. 169, 206 (1917):
The legal relations consequent upon offer and acceptance are not wholly
dependent, even upon the reasonable meaning of the words and acts of
the parties. The law determines these relations in the light of subsequent
circumstances, these often being totally unforeseen by the parties. In
such cases it is sometimes said that the law will create that relation which
the parties would have intended had they foreseen. The fact is, however,
that the decision will depend upon the notions of the court as to policy,
welfare, justice, right and wrong, such notions being inarticulate and
subconscious.
1 Common law developed four distinct rules regarding testimony between
husband and wife. These rules have not always been kept separate in legal
writings. These four categories are: (1) one spouse could not testify in
the other's behalf (2) one spouse could not testify against the other (3) one
spouse could not testify about confidential communications with the other
(4) neither spouse could testify to nonaccess so as to basterdize a child
conceived or born during the marriage. See generally J. MAGUiRE, EVIDENCE,
COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAw 78-101 (1947); D. STANSBURY, NORTH
CAROLINA EVIDENCE §§ 53-61 (2d ed. 1963) [hereinafter cited as STANsnURY]; 8 J. WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE §§ 2285-87, 2332-41 (McNaughton rev.
1961) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE] ; Comment, Evidentiary Privilegesand
Incompetencies of Hitsband and Wife, 4 ARK. L. REv. 426 (1950).
271 N.C. 204, 155 S.E.2d 799 (1967).
3
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16 (Supp. 1967) provides for alimony without
divorce and for custody of any children of the marriage. This section concerns support and not divorce. Shore v. Shore, 220 N.C. 802, 18 S.E.2d 353
(1942).

